D.C. Circuit forbids seizing all electronic storage devices in computer warrant cases - power storage devices

The U. S.
D. Court of AppealC.
S. circuit company released an important computer search case on Friday. Griffith.
The case is about a computer search warrant, in particular whether they can authorize the seizure of all the equipment found by investigators that may contain the evidence sought.
It's frustrating that there are several different ways to explain it, and I'm not sure which way is correct.
I think I will explain why this case is important and why I don't know how to explain it and how it is tense with other decisions. I.
The facts of the case are simple.
Police obtained a search warrant to search the home of a gang member suspected of involvement in the killing.
The authorization order allows the government to confiscate electronic storage equipment at home.
Their idea is that gang members share a lot of information about their crimes that may appear on their electronic devices, such as mobile phones.
When the agents went to execute the search warrant, the accused saw the police coming and throwing the gun out of the window.
The agents executed the search warrant and seized six mobile phones and a tablet computer other than a gun.
At this point, the case turned into a gun case, not a murder case or a computer search case.
The government has accused Griffith of being a heavy criminal with guns.
It did not make any charges against a mobile phone or tablet that were not included in the evidence in this case.
In the new ruling, written by Judge srinode and joined by Judge Pillard, the court Suppressed firearms because of the lack of possible reasons for the authorization of electronic storage devices and because it was too broad.
It was found that the gun was the result of a constitutional search warrant, which was the cause of the court, so the gun was suppressed.
Judge Brown disagreed that the exception of good faith to rule out should apply.
The opinion of srinode points to two fundamental flaws in the search warrant.
First, there is a lack of possible justification for the warrant, as the affidavit does not provide sufficient basis to conclude that the evidence of the crime is at home.
In particular, there is no specific reason to believe that the accused had a telephone or computer;
The specific reason why no one's mobile phone or computer will be at home;
There is not enough reason to believe that there is evidence of a crime on any phone or computer at home.
I don't think the first view is convincing, but the latter two are credible.
I have some objections to this part of the view, but it seems to be the truth --specific. II.
Another important reason for holding is that another holding is very important to me.
In the next part of the opinion, the court ruled that the search warrant was also defective because it allowed the government to confiscate all equipment found at the site of the search.
According to srinkle, the police can only catch specific equipment, not all.
The analysis is as follows: Three.
Understanding the meaning of Griffith helps to understand some of the background principles of the computer search and seizure law.
Computer Search is generally performed in two steps.
The idea is that when the government determines possible reasons to believe that there is criminal evidence in the place to search, which may be stored in a computer, there is no practical way to search for computers found on the website, to find out which computers contain the evidence sought.
It's too long.
In view of this, the court allowed the government to confiscate all electronic storage equipment found on site and bring it back to the government laboratory for analysis.
This is an over-seizure, thinking is running, but there is no practical way to avoid this situation.
This is the worst way to ensure that the government can search for evidence under a search warrant, so it is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
As I wrote in 2005 article "search warrant in the age of digital evidence", this poses a difficult problem in how to draft a computer search warrant.
The question is whether the specific description of the seized item refers to the item seized during the physical search phase (
When all computers are to be confiscated)
, Or should refer to something seized during the electronic search phase (
Specific information when checking the seized computer)?
There is a problem with every answer.
If a search warrant uses a specific description during the physical search phase, then it does not appear that the warrant provides any guidance on what the police will look for during the electronic search phase, and may be too broad, because it does not guide the electronic search phase.
If a search warrant uses a specific description during the electronic search phase, then the government does not say what it captures during the physical search phase, its execution will exceed the apparent licensing authority.
In order to avoid these problems, I suggest that the computer power of attorney should specifically describe the items seized during the physical and electronic search phase.
In this way, the warrants clearly cover what is happening with these two steps.
So far, however, caselaw has been too respectful to the government to require my approach.
The court granted warrants describing only the evidence to be seized in the electronic search phase on the grounds that the excessive seizure in the physical search phase was implied in two-
It's reasonable.
The court also granted a search warrant describing only the evidence to be seized during the physical search phase on the grounds that the authorization order should be understood as allowing only physical computers to search for specific evidence sought during the electronic search phase. IV.
Three views of the Griffith case, enough background.
Let's go back to Griffith's case.
I don't know how to look at the key alternative hold, as the different parts of the opinion seem to imply three different reasons.
I'll cover each one again.
First of all, the other holding part seems to be saying that it is wrong for the government to describe what is to be seized only at the Entity Search stage.
The search warrant says the government can confiscate all electronic storage equipment.
But the search warrant does not say that it can search for computers during the electronic search phase, indicating that they can search for anything without restriction
Too broad. See Slip Op. at 20 (
"The authorization order here does not expressly limit the power of the agent to review any electronic equipment seized. ”)
Most courts go out of their way to read such warrants, as such warrants are implicitly limited to devices that search for specific evidence. See, e. g.
US v. Burgess, 576 F. 3d 1078 (10th Cir. 2009)(
The authorization to authorize the seizure of "all computer records" is interpreted as implicitly limiting the search for computer records to drug trafficking records).
From this point of view, maybe Griffith is not very tolerant of the two.
A stage is needed more than a case like asBurgess.
If this is the correct interpretation of the case, then Griffith is important, but it is also easy to draft.
For example, maybe the solution is similar to two explicit-
The stage specificity description I recommended in 2005.
I tend to think this is the most reasonable interpretation of this view.
But I'm not sure.
Second, the replacement holding section appears to impose restrictions on excessive seizure in the physical search phase.
That being said, part of the view seems to be saying that excessive seizure itself is not allowed: the government cannot take away phones that are unlikely to be found
After their evidence
If there is evidence of any call, it is likely that it is Griffith's call.
Perhaps the court said that when some equipment was more likely to have evidence than others, the government could not plan to confiscate all the equipment.
Griffith could be a bigger deal from this perspective.
Perhaps it is fighting back against established cases, allowing for excessive seizure during the physical search phase.
I should add that I think this is wrong if the court takes this view: I happen to think that excessive seizure is necessary and the court should allow it because you never know where electronic evidence may be
Please see the details in this recent article.
But I'm not sure if the court will do that.
Finally, Griffith's other point is that this case reflects a strange way of linking possible causes with specificity.
The general way to guarantee the work is that the affidavit provides a reason to believe that the evidence may be at the place where it was searched.
The search warrant then allowed a search of the place for evidence.
Part of Griffith's view is more narrow, and perhaps the government has to focus on finding where the evidence may be based on the most credible theory.
In particular, the idea that the government can only take one of Griffith's phones seems strange to me.
If the government determines the possible reasons to believe that there are criminal records in the apartment, who cares if the records are on a phone that "belongs" to Griffith, or are they stored on other devices?
In particular, it is not clear to me why the court held that only one of Griffith's phones could be confiscated.
The court wrote: "For example, officials could have checked the equipment they initially thought might belong to Griffith, but they could not have seized the equipment if they realized it belonged to Lewis.
"But it doesn't make sense to me.
Griffith may have used Lewis's phone.
He may have used a lot of different phones.
Or there may be information about the crime on someone else's phone, such as the information Griffith sent Lewis stored on her phone.
The affidavit does not give a specific reason to think so.
But I don't see what this has to do.
The purpose of the affidavit is to determine the possible cause of the evidence at the place it was searched for, rather than to determine where the evidence will be searched.
The government can usually search for the evidence sought anywhere it is searched, regardless of what container it has to open: "legitimate searches of fixed premises generally extend to the entire area where the search object can be found, and are not restricted by the behavior that may require separate input or open to complete the search.
"US v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 820-21 (1982).
Under this traditional principle, as long as the property is found in the place to be searched, it does not matter who owns the property being searched. See Wyoming v.
Hutton, 526, United States of AmericaS. 295, 303 (1999)(“[N]
Both Ross itself and the historical evidence on which it relies recognize the distinction between title-based packaging or containers. ”). V.
Summing up thoughtsI was curious whether the reader who came to the conclusion through that opinion had a good understanding of which of the above three reasons, which pushed for another holding of the court.
This is entirely possible for others, so it would be very helpful to know where the readership is on this issue.
Two other ideas
First of all, the Integrity analysis of the exclusion rules section of the opinion seems to not match the claim of the ultra-wide defect in the warrants.
Possible cause defects are at least causal with the search warrant: if there is no possible cause, the government will not be able to obtain the warrant.
Without a warrant, the government would not approach the house or see Griffith throwing a gun.
I'm not sure if the lack of possible reasons would make it appropriate to suppress under the exception of good faith, but this is a controversial issue.
However, due to the existence of an ultra-wide defect, the claimed defect has nothing to do with the discovery of the evidence.
When Griffith saw the police come over and throw the gun out of the window, he had no idea how the search warrant was drafted.
Given that the rule of exclusion of illegal evidence caselaw generally requires a causal relationship between constitutional defects and the suppression of evidence, see Hudson v.
Michigan, USA 547S. 586, 592 (2006)
, I don't quite understand how suppression is appropriate for that particular defect.
Finally, in some places, briefings and comments indicate that the government plans to obtain a second authorization to search the equipment.
I have heard that some judges prefer to enforce these two sentences.
The stage computer warrants process using two different warrants.
First, the magistrate signed an order for physical seizure of unauthorized electronic search equipment.
Next, the magistrate signed a second search warrant for a specific device authorizing an electronic search.
For me, it makes no sense to use two warrants to complete the work of a warrant.
Griffith may reflect D to some extent. C.
Rejection of two circuits
Some district judges have clearly expressed their support, which seems to be an irresistible development.